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Consensus has been a predominate ideal in Norwegian local government. The political 
culture is characterised by shared values, like support of the welfare state. The 
consensus ideal is also visible in the framing of the local government system. Broad 
participation in the decision processes is aimed at by a system of proportional 
representation in the municipal council (kommunestyre) and the executive (formann-
skap). Until recently, a qualified majority was also required in most of the decisions 
made by a council. This consensus model in Norwegian - and Scandinavian - local 
government is often contrasted with the models of other countries. Thus the more 
politicised model of Southern Europe is considered to be characterised by party rivalry 
and concentration of power, while the Anglo-American model emphasises management 
and cost efficiency (Baldersheim and Goldsmith 1993). 
 Today, alternative government models are gaining ground in Norwegian 
communes too (Bukve and Hagen 1991, 1994). On the one hand, the capital city Oslo 
and Hedmark county municipality have tried out a parliamentary model, strengthening 
the position and responsibilities of the majority (Baldersheim and Strand 1988, Hagen 
1991). This model implies that the municipal government is dependent on the majority 
in the municipal or county council. On the other hand, management models emanating 
from the business world are a source of reforms aiming at increasing the effectiveness 
of the communes as service businesses (Bukve 1991). This line of thinking has been 
influential during the last years, not least on the ideological level. 
 The new Norwegian Local Government Act, that came into operation from 
January 1993, has also given the communes more freedom to choose between different 
government models. In addition to the traditional aldermen model (formann-
skapsmodellen), it is now possible to choose a parliamentary model or to organise the 
municipality according to the principles of management models.  The increased 
freedom also means that the communes have got the opportunity to organise according 
to market models.  Thus, we may experience more organisational differentiation among 
Norwegian communes in the future. 
 An important question in organisation theory regards the consequences of 
particular organisation structures. My intention in the paper is also to pose this question.  
I have chosen the labels consensus democracy, majority rule and management models 
for the local government models in question. A cross-national study is needed if one 
wants to cover the possible range of variation in local government models. On the other 
hand, cross-national comparison is difficult because many other factors, like tasks, 
central-local relations and political culture, vary simultaneously. For this reason, it may 
be useful to compare within a national setting, even if the range of models within a 
nation is narrower. In this article, I will   discuss what effects the three government 
models have for role perceptions, decision styles and budget discipline in Norwegian 
communes. 
 
 
GOVERNMENT FORM AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE  
In the debate over democratic government models, consensus democracy and majority 
rule (Lijphart 1984, 1991) are key concepts. As far as I know, this distinction has not 
been used in a systematic way in comparative studies of local government models. But, 
with some modifications, it is possible to use these concepts even in the study of the 
institutional forms of local government.  
 The mainstream of political science has considered majority rule, with a choice 
between clear-cut alternatives, as the prototype of democratic government. Political 
stability, a strong leadership and well-defined responsibilities are often emphasised as 
the main advantages of majority rule. On the other hand, the merits of consensus 
democracy lie in high legitimacy attained through just representation and 
responsiveness through a more dispersed representation.     
 Lijphart (1984) has argued that consensus democracy is most suitable in a 
society where conflicts are strong. In such a situation, restrictions on the use of power 
by the majority can be useful to prevent a breakdown of the society. On the other hand, 
it is argued that the consensus model will tend to maintain status quo. The mechanisms 
intended to prevent abuse of power can also give a veto to conservative minorities. The 
reply of the defenders of consensus democracy is that such a view focuses more on 
formal decisions than on policy implementation. Majority rule can make it more easy to 
make decisions about changes, but dissatisfied minorities may prevent real changes in 
the implementation process (Steiner and Dorff 1980). Thus, informal decision 
mechanisms based on consensus and a shared ideology can be more effective in creating 
real changes than formal decisions which give the minority a chance to avoid any 
responsibility for the decision and the outcome (Brunsson 1984, Steiner and Dorff 
1980). 
 Management models are phenomenona belonging to the last decade. Their roots 
can be found in the Anglo-American tradition of local government, with emphasis on 
cost efficiency and orientation towards the market or the customer (Olsen 1993). In this 
tradition, little is said about the normative and ethical foundations of democracy as a 
form of government. More attention is given to rational leadership and adaptation to 
customer preferences than to the shaping of a public opinion through democratic 
procedures and processes. In this tradition the municipalities are not primarily bearers 
of a general territorial competence, but a conglomeration of functional service-
delivering agencies. 
 The argument in favour of the management model maintains that this model will 
lead to a more efficient use of resources than the political/bureaucratic models, and also 
that it will be more responsive to user demands. Much of this argument is based on an 
ideal model of the market, presented as a decentralised decision system where the 
customers/consumers in the last instance decide what is to be produced. They express 
their needs, the producers adapt and produce what is demanded. The prices are a result 
of demand and free competition.  
 In relation to government the market model may be used in different ways. In 
the first variant of the model, the users of public services will be considered as 
customers. To make this kind of model work, the customers must have the opportunity 
to choose between service producers. Public monopolies in the service sector must be 
abolished. Public support ought to be given as cash support to the service users. Thus 
they will be able to buy the services where they get most for their money. Such a way of 
thinking implies that the responsibility of political bodies for giving priority to and co-
ordination of service production will be diminished. Quality and price are to be decided 
through competition in the market. 
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 The second variant of the market model looks at the politicians as customers and 
the administration as producers of services. In this model a more clear-cut division 
between politics and administration is demanded. The politicians have to order the kind 
of services they want, with specifications of quality and price. When the bargain 
between customers and producers is settled, it is the administration's task to produce the 
services according to the specifications. This model also entails that the public 
monopoly in service delivery has to be abolished. Public agencies and institutions will 
have to compete with private businesses. The relationship between the 
politicians/customers and the producers is based on contract.  
 Still another variant of management thinking in the political system focuses less 
on market-simulation and more on transfer of management techniques from private 
businesses to the public sector. Politicians are considered as share owners and goal 
producers. The main field of interest lies in producing management techniques for more 
efficient administration and service production, like Management by Objectives and 
framework budgeting, with focus on spending targets for each policy area rather than 
incremental changes to existing budgets. With  regard to the politicians, a change in 
roles is considered more important than institutional change, but most recommendations 
stress the need for concentration of political power. 
 These types of management models may be combined, but they build on 
different assumptions about the role of politicians. They  have also been criticised from 
different points of view. The management model has been criticised for promoting an 
untenable view of politics and the role of politicians. Politicians are elected to represent 
different values and interests. The view of the politicians as producers of unambiguous 
goals is naïve in relation to the way real political processes take place (Bukve 1991a, 
Offerdal 1989). Additionally the view that competition creates efficiency in public 
services is not supported by current research  (Støkken and Nylehn 1991). This leads to 
a questioning of the efficiency of privatisation compared to a strategy of 
decentralisation and organisation development within the framework of public 
administration. 
 
 
A typology of government models 
We can distinguish between majority rule, consensus democracy and the management 
model on several dimensions.  
1. The power basis of the executive is different: In the majority model it is the majority 
of the council, in the consensus model it is the community as a whole, and in the 
management model it is technical competence in management and service production. 
2. The typical electoral system or participation form  will also differ: The typical 
election system in majority is plurality elections, and in the consensus model it is 
proportional representation. In the management model participation is realised  through 
a preferential voting or political money system, where the citizen-consumer has several 
votes to distribute among candidates according to his or her preferences (Coleman 
1970).  
3. The degree of politicisation is typically high in the majority rule-system, low in a 
consensus system or management-based system. 
4. The competence of the local government is typically a broad territorial competence in 
the majority and consensus models, while it is a functional competence in the 
management model. 
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A difference in government forms that is not accounted for by our models, is the 
difference between government models with a single-person executive and models with 
collective executive bodies or a fragmented executive. This distinction may be viewed 
as a modification of Lijphart's (1992) distinction between presidential and parliamentary 
democracy. Taking this distinction into account, we can combine the dimensions of 
executive form and government model in a six-fold table. This is done in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Typology of government models 
  Government 
              form 
 
Executive 
structure 
Majority 
rule 
Consensus 
democracy 
Management 
model 
Single- 
person 
executive 
 Partisan 
 mayor 
 Non- 
 partisan 
 mayor 
 
 Corporate 
 manager 
Collective or 
fragmented 
executive 
 Majority 
 executive 
(parliamentary 
 model) 
 Coalition 
 executive 
 (aldermen 
 model) 
 "Contracting 
 out"  
 committee 
 
 
Within majority rule, we can make a distinction between a form with a municipal 
government based on the majority in the council and a model with a strong mayor. An 
example of the first category is the Italian model organised around la giunta comunale 
(Vandelli 1992), while the French maire is the prototype of the second form 
(Hoffmann-Martinot 1993). 
 Within a consensus model we may draw a distinction between a model where 
the executive is elected by proportional representation, like the Norwegian 
formannskap, and a model with a strong, but non-partisan mayor which we can find in a 
number of US municipalities (Bowen 1980, Wolman 1990).  
 Within the management model, the distinction will have to be drawn  between a 
form with a strong manager, found in US municipalities with the city-manager form, 
and a market-simulating model where the role of the council is to contract out services 
to private businesses, organisations and others. In the UK, this model has been labelled 
"the contracting-out committee" (Batley and Stoker 1991). In New Zealand, too, local 
government has recently been reorganised according to this model (Weller 1991). The 
variant from which we have Norwegian data, is the managerial model. Only recently 
have Norwegian communes shown some interest in the contracting out-model. 
 The placing of countries within this typology will have to be modified due to 
national characteristics and internal variations. Thus, the degree of politicisation in UK 
local government has usually been high and increased during the 80's, while in the ideal 
type we would expect a low degree of politicisation to be associated with the 
management model. Local government models do not usually exist as "clean" ideal 
types. Many of the forms we actually find are hybrids in some or other way. However, 
the examples above show that our typology is relevant enough to catch important 
variations in local government models. 
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The dependent variables 
In principle, institutional forms can have effects on both the input side of the political 
system, the internal processes and on policy output. Here, the object is to analyse the 
process aspect and some dimensions of the effects on policy output. If the organisation 
of local government does matter, the political process and policy performance should 
vary according to the variation in organisational settings found between countries and 
often within countries.   
 A main problem to be analysed is the consequences of institutions for the role 
perceptions and mental maps of the local politicians, and consequences for decision 
styles in the political bodies. Another problem is to analyse the effects of institutional 
differences on the output side. In this respect, the intention is to explore effects on 
budget discipline, and also effects on service production. 
 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NORWAY - A CASE OF CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY 
Using the suggested typology as our point of departure, we will find that the Norwegian 
system of local government shows several features of the consensus democratic model 
(Lijphart 1984, 1990). This is indicated by the structure of the representation system, 
the power basis of the executive board and the low degree of politicisation of local 
government. After a basic introduction to the tasks and structure of Norwegian local 
government, I will discuss these features of  Norwegian communes. In the last part of 
the article, I will present some recent changes in local government organisation and 
discuss the effects of these changes. 
 
 
Basic features of Norwegian local government 
Today, Norway has 435 communes and 18 county municipalities. The capital Oslo has a 
special status, being a commune but including the responsibilities of a county. The 
average municipal size is about 9,900 inhabitants. Roughly, about one-third of the 
communes have less than 3,000 inhabitants, one-third between 3,000 and 7,000, and the 
remaining third more than 7,000 inhabitants. After the last amalgamation of communes 
in the 1960's, there are left only a few municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants. In 
a recent government report (NOU 1992:15), it is suggested that the standard minimum 
size of a commune should be 5,000 inhabitants. This is considered to be a necessary 
size for effective service production and reduction of pro capita administrative costs. 
There will probably be a new amalgamation process before the end of this decade. But 
it is difficult yet to predict how far-reaching this process will be. This will depend upon 
a political contest with classical demarcation lines: one the one hand considerations of 
effectiveness and costs, on the other hand care for the conditions of local democracy.  
 The legal arrangements concerning local government can be divided in the Local 
Government Act and the so-called special legislation. The Local Government Act 
primarily concerns matters of procedure and organisation of the local political bodies. 
Formally, the freedom of the communes is said to be "negatively restricted". The 
communes may involve themselves in any matter that is not the statutory responsibility 
of other bodies or agencies.   
 Compared to Britain and Southern Europe, Norway and the other Scandinavian 
countries are characterised by a higher degree of "legal localism" (Page 1991). 
However, the manoeuvre space of Norwegian communes ought not to be overestimated. 
There has been a long-term trend towards closer integration of national and local 
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government policies, rooted in considerations of redistribution, equality, cost efficiency 
and macro economic policy needs  (Kjellberg 1991). Even if the new Local Government 
Act and other recent reforms gives the communes more freedom in procedural affairs, 
the purpose of this freedom is not only to increase the autonomy of local government.  
 
 
The representation system 
Proportional representation and a multi-party system is considered to be the basic 
features of the representation system in a consensus model. In both respects, Norway 
fits into the model. The municipal council is elected by proportional representation for a 
four-year term. The average size of the council is approximately 30 membersi. In the 
last years, Norway has had eight parties usually getting more than one percent of the 
total votes at national and local elections.  Six of these parties had more than five 
percent of the votes at the last municipal election (1991). Those parties will get seats in 
most of the communes where they have a local party caucus and run for elections. Thus, 
the majority of the Norwegian parties are represented in most of the councils.  
 The party-system is truly multi-dimensional, allowing for different alliances 
depending on the type of issue. Since 1961, no single party have had a majority in the 
Norwegian parliament. And even at the municipal level, an absolute majority by one 
party is a deviant case. The need for coalitions and consensus building is obvious. 
 The mayor is elected by the council among its members. Election of mayors can 
be considered as an indicator of coalition behaviour in the municipal councils. But 
usually, mayoral election coalitions are not stable voting coalitions. Most often, the 
partners in a mayor election have no obligations to cooperate after the election. Only in 
a very few cases, a coalition platform or at least a decision to establish some kind of 
formalised co-operation is found.           
 
 
The power basis of the executive 
The municipal executive board is elected by and among the members of the municipal 
council. Until 1993 it was required by law that one-quarter of the members of the 
council should be elected to the board. The Local Government Act of 1993 permits the 
municipalities to choose the number of members of the board, with a minimum 
membership of five.  The board is elected by proportional representation, so that the 
parties are represented on this board on the basis of their strength on the municipal 
council. Thus, the executive board are recruited from the council as a whole, not only 
from the majority. This method for selection of the executive board is within the 
tradition of the aldermen model, where the members of the executive board are chosen 
among the most experienced council members of all parties. The municipal executive 
board is responsible for presenting a budget proposal for the council, and usually make 
recommendations in cases for consideration by the municipal council. The board can 
also be empowered to render decisions in certain cases.   
 Lipjhart (1984) argues that in a majority system, the executive is able to 
dominate over the elected assembly due to the possible threat of resignation. In a 
consensus system, the power will be more divided between the executive and the 
assembly. One question is whether Lijphart's argument takes into consideration the 
possible variations in coalition behaviour within the two systems. If we have a system 
with proportional representation and without any kind of formal coalitions at the party 
level, it is possible for the executive to become the most important arena for negotia-
tions and construction of majority blocks from one case to another. 
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    In fact, the executive board seems to have such a strong position in Norwegian 
communes. A usual complaint is that the role of the municipal council has declined. 
While the council used to be the most important decision-making arena, nowadays it is 
only rubber-stamping the recommendations of the executive. One reason for this is that 
the case-load has increased and the decisions have become more complex, making it 
more difficult to push forward new proposals in the last stage of decision-making. 
Another reason is that the councils have not been able to take on a leadership role 
through a process of strategic policy-making or formulation of broad guide-lines for the 
work of the administration and the executive.        
 Of course, considerable obstacles to a strategic policy-making is inherent is the 
nature of politics itself. Politicians are representatives of the people. This means that 
they are elected in order to represent contrasting interests and promote different 
solutions. Where a stable majority coalition is not found, the formulation of policies 
will have to become piecemeal. It can be argued that the structure of consensus 
government, with its built-in safeguards against abuse of power by a majority, increases 
the barriers towards strategic policy-making.  But one obstacle to formulation of 
broader political guidelines also seems to stem from another source, that is from a 
relatively low degree of politicisation in the system.    
 
 
The degree of politicisation 
Most electoral lists in Norwegian communes are party-political lists. In some 
communes, especially small, rural municipalities, local lists may be found. During the 
last decades, the number of local lists have been declining. But in the municipal election 
of 1991, local lists won more seats than in the election of 1987. But they still got only 
about 5% of the total number of seats. Some observers have been speaking about the 
1991 elections as a revival of community-based politics, a conclusion that may seem 
somewhat exaggerated.     
 Even if the political parties are controlling recruitment to local government 
bodies, a high degree of politicisation within these bodies should not be taken as 
granted. At least two crucial factors are working to reduce the importance of the party 
dimension at the local level. Firstly, the municipal bodies do not control the income side 
of the budget. Secondly, the communes have wide responsibilities in implementing 
national policies. This means that a large part of the local government's  activities 
consists of implementation of policies launched by the national government.  
 Formally, Norwegian communes have a general competence as territorial 
political bodies. The communes may involve themselves in any matter that is not the 
statutory responsibility of other bodies or agencies. 
 But the commune's possibility to collect taxes for new tasks is limited. The main 
sources of income for the communes are income taxes and state grants. The maximum 
level of income tax is fixed by the state, and today the maximum level is used by all of 
the communes. The political contest in the communes is confined to allocate a more or 
less given amount of money. Since disagreement about the level of public spending is 
one important dividing line between the political parties, this means that party politics 
at the local level are politics under restrictive conditions.  
 Secondly, the communes have vast responsibilities in the implementation of 
national policies. Special legislation gives the Norwegian communes responsibility for 
providing a wide range of services to the inhabitants. The services of the welfare state 
are mainly provided by the communes. Standards for the provision of these services are 
often given by the national legislation. What is left to the local government bodies, is to 
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allocate a limited amount of financial resources between a range of obligatory tasks and 
to give priority to the different tasks.  
 The logic behind the system is that national policies need to be adapted to local 
conditions. The local politician's role is to be a representative of the common man, the 
layman, and thus a balancing force towards the power of the administration in policy 
implementation. With help of the layman's judgement and balancing power, represen-
tation of the local inhabitants and implementation of national policies can be reconciled. 
The local politician's role is a reactive one. The main task is to adapt national policies to 
local conditions, not so much to take political initiatives of their own. In a comparative 
perspective, Norway can be characterised by a lower degree of political localism (Page 
1991).    
 
 
TURNING LAYMEN INTO LEADERS - WHAT HAS REALLY CHANGED? 
During the after-war period, there has been a steady growth in Norwegian local 
government. Most of this growth was related to the adoption of new welfare tasks,  
usually initiated and partly financed by the state. 
 The growth raised the importance of local government, but at the same time 
problems were created. A crucial problem was how to control costs at the local 
government level (Baldersheim 1993). A fragmented decision structure at the municipal 
level, and the strength of alliances between sector politicians, professionals and clients, 
were seen as important sources for this problem. The forces demanding more services 
and more spending had a strong position compared to those with responsibility for co-
ordination and balancing of the budget.  
 Several reforms attempted to change this situation. Firstly, the fragmented 
committee structure was reformed from the end of the 1970's. Before this reform, the 
average commune could have 60-80 different committees, each with a specialised task. 
The solution was to create four or five sector committees for the main local government 
sectors, integrating all committees within the sector in a main committee called a 
principal standing committeeii.  
 Secondly, the relation between state and local government has been changed in 
order to increase the communes' ability to decide the priorities of their tasks and take 
responsibility for their own effectiveness. An important part of this was the reform of 
the grant system. A block grant system was introduced in 1986 to replace a system 
where state grants were given as ear-marked grants for specific tasks. The free-
commune experiments from 1987 were especially geared towards the need for more 
innovative communes. And the new Local Government Act has given the communes 
more freedom to organise their own affairs. 
 Lastly, it has been attempted to create a stronger political leadership. These 
attempts are taking municipal leadership in two directions. First, a couple of 
municipalities have experimented with a parliamentary model, concentrating political 
power in the hands of the council majority. This, it has been argued, would create 
clearer responsibilities for the decisions taken and promote a more strategic leadership. 
 Another road to a stronger political leadership has been through the introduction 
of new management techniques, like Management by Objectives and frame budgeting. 
The argument runs that politicians should not spend their time working on details. 
Rather, they ought to concentrate on broad strategies and guide-lines for the work of the 
administration. Arrangements for a more clear-cut division between administrative and 
political tasks was another aim for those defending a new view of the role of politicians. 
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 Thus, the challenges to the dominating consensus model in Norwegian local 
government is closely connected to the desire for a stronger and more effective political 
leadership. The politicians ought to change their roles from laymen into leaders. But 
what has really come out of the different attempts to change the organisation models 
and political roles in Norwegian local government? That question I will try to illuminate 
in the following  section. 
 
 
EXPERIENCES WITH PARLIAMENTARISM IN NORWEGIAN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
After the elections of 1995, the new LGA permits Norwegian communes to introduce 
majority rule by choosing a parliamentary model of local government. Until now, a 
parliamentary model has been tried in the capital city Oslo since 1986 and in Hedmark 
county municipality in the period 1988-91iii. I consider these experiments the most far-
reaching in introducing new local government models in Norway so far, and in 
particular the most relevant for our discussion of the effects of government models. 
 In table 4, we compare the different parliamentary structures with the structure 
of the traditional aldermen model. The table shows that the model allowed in the new 
LGA is most similar to the model chosen in Oslo. The model in Hedmark was 
somewhat different from a standard parliamentary model, since a vote of no confidence 
to the county government was not possible. Another special feature of the Hedmark 
parliamentarism was that the members of the county government had to be recruited 
from the county council. 
 In the public debate on parliamentarism the change to majority rule has been 
considered as a means to create clearer responsibilities and a better co-ordination of the 
government's decisions. The expectation is that majority rule will strengthen leadership 
and increase attention towards long-term goals. A special focus in the debate has been 
the need for clearer responsibilities in financial steering. In a consensus model with 
strong sectors, it is too easy for changing majorities to pass cost-increasing decisions, 
without having to take responsibility for balancing the books.     
 To the contrary, it is claimed that majority rule will create a dangerous 
concentration of power and weaken the rights of the opposition. From this position, 
broad participation in decision processes and sharing of power is considered an 
advantage. Thus, the arguments in the Norwegian debate sounds much in tune with the 
arguments found in the political scientists' discussions of majority rule versus consensus 
democracy. 
 
 
Parliamentarism in Oslo and Hedmark 
Oslo has since 1986 a seven-member city government with support from the majority of 
the city council. The cabinet members are responsible for particular administrative 
sectors, but they have a collegial responsibility for decisions in the government and 
instructions to the administration.  
 An evaluation of the city government's first years (Baldersheim and Strand 
1988) concluded that the experiment had several ambitious goals pulling in different 
directions. The level of accomplishment of the different goals were uneven. What is 
accomplished, is a more exactly located political responsibility, a more integrated and 
strategic policy-making and a strengthening of the politicians compared to the 
administration. Power has been concentrated in the city government, while the council 
has lost power. Frustration among administrative leaders was a negative product of the 
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reform. The administrative leadership represents a competence resource that is lesser 
used than before the reform. Lastly, the evaluators found that the reform had small 
consequences for service production. Their conclusion is that such changes must be 
initiated at the street bureaucrat level. There are loose couplings between overall 
structural reforms and service to the inhabitants. 
 Hedmark county municipality chose a small county government with three 
ministers, elected by and among the members of the county council. There was not 
possible to raise a vote of no confidence to the government. Thus, the Hedmark model 
is not a complete parliamentary model. In the evaluation (Hagen 1991) of the Hedmark 
parliamentarism, a concentration of power in the city government also was found. 
Among the council politicians, it is especially the members of the opposition who 
experience that their influence is reduced. Much of the reason is that decision processes 
are more closed than before the reform. When Hagen compares financial data from 
Oslo, Hedmark and counties without a parliamentary model, he concludes that financial 
steering and budget discipline is not better in the counties with majority rule.  
 While Oslo has continued with their parliamentary model for eight years, 
Hedmark returned to the old model in 1992 after heated political discussions in the 
council. 
 
 
Parliamentarism, political roles and decision styles 
The experiences with parliamentarism show that what was expected from a majority 
government model partly has been fulfilled. Concentration of power and a relative 
strengthening of local politicians compared to the administration is attained through 
introduction of majority rule. Particularly, it is the top political leadership who has 
become more visible and gained a stronger position. Responsibility can be placed more 
precisely than before. The opposite side of this coin is that the opposition's influence 
and access to information is reduced.  
 What we have not been able to study yet, is the possible consequences of 
parliamentarism on political culture and political contest in Norwegian local 
government. One first question is to what extent local authorities in Norway will choose 
majority rule. And if they do, how will parliamentarism affect political culture? Will we 
find more polarisation and competition between political alternatives? Or is the 
potential for political conflict within Norwegian local government to limited to cause 
such effects?   
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Table 2: Varieties of parliamentarism compared with the aldermen model 
 
 
             Model 
 
Central traits 
Aldermen model LGA parliamen- 
tarism 
Oslo Hedmark Norway 
Appointment Proportional Plurality Plurality Plurality The king upon 
advice from the 
President of the 
Parliament 
Recruitment  Council No/few 
restrictions 
No/few    
restrictions 
County council No/few  
restrictions 
Recommendations 
to the council 
Executive board as 
collegium 
Government as 
collegium 
Government as 
collegium 
Government as 
collegium or dele-
gated 
Government as 
collegium 
Vote of no 
confidence 
Not possible 
 
Possible Possible Not Possible Possible 
Power to instruct the 
administration  
Mayor / chief exe-
cutive officer 
 
Collegium or dele-
gated to each mi-
nister  
Collegium Collegium Minister 
 
 
Parliamentarism and policy performance 
The evaluations of local parliamentarism concluded that expectations about a better 
financial management has not been fulfilled. Several reasons may explain this. One 
reason is that local politicians is devoted to producing service for the inhabitants more 
than to financial steering. Another reason is that the local politicians have only limited 
possibilities to influence the income side of their budgets. Their responsibility is 
restricted to allocating expenses within given frames. 
 The conclusion also was that the introduction of parliamentarism had few if any 
effects on service production. The link from top-level politics to the performance of 
street bureaucrats does not seem to be very close.  
 
 
MANAGERIALISM IN NORWEGIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The efforts to strengthen political leadership have taken place in an ideological 
atmosphere where much of the premises and arguments has come from the private 
business sector and more specified from the introduction of corporate management 
techniques in English local government during the 70's (Baldersheim 1986). Much of 
the rhethorics around the reforms has been borrowed from this tradition. However, it 
would be an exaggeration to claim that the Norwegian local government in the 80's has 
been reformed according to the principles of corporate management. Most of the basic 
features of the consensus model still are alive in the vast majority of communes. But 
some local governments went further than the standard introduction of principal 
standing committees  and new techniques like MbO. They tried to reorganise the 
commune entirely according to the principles of corporate management in the private 
sector. The municipal council was assumed to take the role of the concern's general 
meeting. The executive board was given responsibilities similar to the company board. 
The mayor's role was to be the chairman of the board, and the head of the municipal 
administration was analogous to the company CEO. 
 The more market- and consumer-oriented strand of management models was not 
much influential in Norwegian in the 80's. These ideas belong to a later wave, only 
appearing in the last few years (Baldersheim, 1993).  
 
 
Corporate management in Selje 
In Norway, no commune have tried to introduce the corporate management model as 
completely as Selje, a small rural and fishing community in Western Norway (Bukve 
1991). Selje  participated in the Free Commune Program in the years 1987-1990. In this 
period, the commune tried out a thoroughbred corporate management model.  I will 
briefly describe the case of Selje to illuminate the potential of the managerialist models 
to change the political processes in local government. 
 In the outline of the experiment, the municipal council's role was changed to 
have only two meetings every year: One meeting  to decide upon the budget for next 
year, one to decide upon the long-term structure plan. All other decisions were 
delegated to the executive board, the standing committees and the administration. 
Frame budgeting was introduced. Only the total amount given to each committee sector 
should be finally decided in the council. The executive board was raised to the position 
of the strategic apex in "Selje Ltd.", as the commune metaphorically was called. 
 What really happened in Selje, was that the entire experiment crash-landed 
within three years. Struggles of competence evolved between the council and the board. 
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In principle, all specific decisions on loans, investments, establishment of new services 
or changes in established services was the responsibility of the board, within the general 
budget frames and plans decided by the council. In practice, budgets and plans did not 
provide the necessary guidelines for all board decisions, and the aggregated effects of 
the specific decisions in the board made it necessary to adjust budget frames and plans. 
The consequence of this situation was a bitter struggle between the board and the 
council. Many of the board's decisions were changed when appealed to the council. This 
led some members of the board to accuse the council majority that they were not loyal 
to the new rules of the game. Members of the boards and standing committees also 
resorted to well-known complaints that the budget frames of the council were 
impossible to live with. Therefore, they wanted to put the responsibility for specific 
decisions within their area back to the council.        
 The problem was clearly articulated in the debate on reduction of the number of 
primary schools in Selje. Several small community schools, some of them with low and 
decreasing numbers of pupils, were still run in the commune. In order to balance the 
budget, the council decided to reduce the budget frames given to the standing 
committee for schools. However, the council did not give guidelines for how reductions 
in the school sector should be implemented. It was left to the school committee to 
decide on whether schools had to be closed, how many schools and which ones. The 
school committee refused to close any schools, claiming that the budget frames had to 
be changed. The whole case went into a deadlock for years, budgets were exceeded, and 
the municipal economy came close to a collapse. More and more people became 
convinced that the corporate management model was a part of the problem, and after 
three years it was decided to end the experiment ahead of schedule.  
 
 
Managerialism, role perceptions and decision styles 
One reason why the corporate management experiment in Selje did not succeed seems 
to be that managerialist thinking disregards important aspects of political activity. It 
starts out from the notion that politicians should formulate the broader objectives and 
deployment of resources, while leaving the details and implementation to the 
administration. But all politicians do not accept this conception of their role. Politicians 
are elected for different parties with different programmes. It is part of their role to 
struggle for their programme and views even if this should mean opposition to 
established plans and guidelines. It is also part of the politicians role to find politically 
viable solutions to make things happen, even if those solutions are not always internally  
consistent or in accordance with existing plans. 
 The political arena is thus a field of tension between, on the one hand, the 
struggle on behalf of particular values and interests and, on the other, the engendering 
of agreement and collaboration on arriving at reasonable solutions. The consensus-
building integrators and the party politicians who fight for  their visions thereby 
constitutes not only two types of politicians, but also the poles of a political field in 
which the politician must constantly redefine his or her position on the basis of the 
essence of the case and the situation to hand. This aspect of political activity is not 
captured by the corporate management models.  
 
 
Managerialism and policy performance 
Managerialism has not had much success in the task of improving policy performance 
through a change of the politician's role. However, managerialism in local government 
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is not confined to this task. Connected to a managerialist approach also are a set of 
administrative methods aiming at "cleaning up" the political arena and the borderlines 
between political and administrative tasks. One example is increased delegation of 
routine cases to the administration, thus leaving the politicians with better time and 
opportunities to concentrate on the politically important cases.  Another example is 
more self-determination for institutions like schools and hospitals in their internal 
administration, by removing politicians from the boards and granting wider 
responsibilities for the internal resource allocation. A third example is cleaning up the 
intertwining between political and administrative phases in the decision process. 
 In a study of the effects of this kind of methods in a sample of Norwegian Free 
Communes, Bukve (1991) found that positive effects were perceived by both politicians 
and administration. A clear majority of the administrators said that more discretion had 
improved their working situation. Politicians were a bit more double-minded. They felt 
that routine cases ought to be delegated, but also expressed some fear of losing 
important information that could be extracted from knowledge of specific cases.   
 What must be held in mind, however, is that these reforms of administrative 
routines are not necessarily connected to a managerialist view of politics. It is possible 
to implement reforms of the kind mentioned in local government without aiming at a 
total change of the political organisation.   
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION - SOME 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
Role perceptions among local politicians 
From a theoretical point of view, we would assume that if organisation does matter, role 
perceptions among politicians would vary according to the institutional context. 
Politicians acting within a consensus model will attach importance to the integrative 
aspect of politics. Within a majority model they will emphasise promotion of group or 
party values, while contributing to rational decision processes should be considered the 
duty of the politicians within a management model.  
 In an enquete to politicians in four Norwegian communes4 (Bukve 1991a), co-
ordination and a good allocation of resources was ranked as the most important task 
(considered as very important by 78%), compared to goal formulation (68%), 
contributing to innovation and new solutions (61%), and promoting the party's 
programme (50%). Thus, the role perceptions seem to be in accordance with what we 
would expect in a model with a low level of party conflict. But we can also notice that 
the view of politics as rational decision making which we would expect to find in a 
management model, is gaining a strong foothold. This view is strong in all of the 
communes, and does not  vary according to differences in organisation models between 
the communes.  
 There are also some politicians who view themselves as defenders of a particular 
sector (10%) or a a fighter for specific cases (36%). But these are minorities among the 
council members. 
 A factor analysis of these data reveals that we can distinguish between several 
types of politicians. The most important are: 
- The goal formulator, attaching importance to goal-formulation, co-ordination, 
reorganisation and enhancing effectiveness.  
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- The integrator, attaching importance to co-operation across party borders, finding new 
ideas and solutions, reorganisation and effectiveness. 
- The party politician, busy with promoting the party programme and not in favour of 
co-operation across party borders. 
 In addition, we find politicians who could be labelled sector politicians and case 
advocates, fighting for particular issues.     
 Measured by the politicians' own role perceptions, there seems to be a model 
conflict in Norwegian local government between a top down type politician, the goal 
formulator, and the integrator, who is a process-oriented, bottom up type politician. 
Probably, this model conflict partly is the result of the ideological influence gained by 
the managerialist conception of politics. 
 One interesting question in future comparative work  would be to explore cross-
country variations in the role perceptions of local politicians. Are such variations related 
to national political cultures, to the structuring of state-local relationships, or do the 
internal organisation of local government matter? And what impact do variations have 
on political processes and performance?  
 
 
Decision styles in local government 
Decision styles can be discussed with reference to what types  of cases that are 
dominating in local government bodies, and with reference to how the politicians take 
their decisions.  
 The question of how decisions are taken is discussed by several authors. 
Lembruch (1974) and Lipjhart (1969) distinguish between competitive and non-
competitive decision styles. The first style is characterised by conflicts lasting until a 
decision is made, usually by a majority vote.  The last is labelled by Lembruch as 
"amicable agreement". In this style dissent disappears during the process, and an 
unanimous decision is made.  
 Bacrach and Baratz (1970) broadens the perspective with their introduction of 
the non-decision concept, which refers to potential conflicts that are shut out form the 
formal decision making arenas. Steiner and Dorff (1980) add a fourth style, decision by 
interpretation. This concept points to a situation where a formal decision is not made.  
One of the actors is presenting an interpretation of the essence in the discussion, and 
this interpretation is tacitly accepted by the other participants.  
 Brunsson (1985) distinguishes between a rational and an impressionistic 
decision style. According to Simon (1957), the rational decision-making process can be 
described as a process where decisions are derived from value premises combined with 
factual premises or information about the given situation. In the impressionistic decision 
style, values are activated on basis of information about the situation. In next phase, the 
activated values are used to define the situation and defend a point of view. Brunsson 
claims that this style often is used in political decision processes, and that the essence of 
politics is to establish a predominant interpretation of a situation.  
 Thus, the mentioned decision styles can be understood as different strategies to 
establish a prevailing definition of a situation. Where disagreement persists, a majority 
decision is needed because different values are activated or there is disagreement about 
factual premises. Amicable agreement or decision by interpretation can be used where a 
given set of values are accepted as most relevant, or where a given point of view may be 
founded upon different sets of values.   
 Regarding how decisions are taken, we would expect to find that decision styles 
are oriented towards amicable agreement or decision by interpretation in the consensus 
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model, formal voting and majority decisions in the majority model, and rational analysis 
of consequences in the management model.  
 Another dimension of decision style is type of cases to be decided in a political 
body. The argument behind the management model is that political decisions ought to 
be restricted to the strategic level. Details and routine decisions must be made on the 
basis of strategic goals in a rational decision process which is administrative rather than 
political in nature, or transferred to the market. If this argument is in step with real 
organisational change, we would expect to find the highest degree of structural cases 
within a management model and the lowest degree within a consensus model.  
 Køhn (1990) has looked at what happened in a Norwegian municipality trying to 
move the system towards strategic policy-making. He used Kjellberg's (1977) typology 
of politics. The dimensions of this typology are type of goods (individual or collective) 
and effects on the individual (direct and indirect). Thus, we can distinguish between co-
ordinatory policy, regulatory policy, distributive policy and redistributive policy. The 
two first policy types are types of structural policy, the last ones are allocative policy.  
 
 
Table 3: Types of political decisions 
 
 
       Type of goods  
 
  Individual Collective 
 
 
Effect on the  
 
Direct 
1 
Distribution 
2 
Redistribution 
individual 
 
Indirect 3 
Regulation 
4. 
Coordination 
 
 
 
Source: Kjellberg (1977) 
 
 
Køhn studied types of cases in the executive board before and after structural reforms. 
He found that the number of cases in the executive board had been reduced. But it was 
the number of every type of cases that were reduced. The relative share of co-ordination 
policy and regulatory policy did not increase between the two periods. Even if the 
strategy oriented goal formulator has gained a foothold in the politicians' self-
perception, it seems more difficult to change the way the system really functions. Our 
case study of Selje also seems to support this conclusion. 
 In contrast with the futile efforts of managerialist approaches to strategic policy-
making, majority rule in Oslo and Hedmark did result in changes in decision styles. 
Both places, power was concentrated in the hands of the majority party.  The division 
between  majority and opposition was strengthened during the periods with a 
parliamentary model, in accordance with our hypothesis. 
 A fairly safe conclusion would be that the organisation of local government does 
matter for decision styles, but not in the way that managerialists assume. The reason for 
this seems to lie in their distorted view of what is the core of politics. Politics is not only 
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goal formulation. Politics is an activity in a field of tensions between interest 
representation on the one side and compromises and integration on the other. That is 
why the political game is not played the way managerialists presume. 
 
Organisation models and policy performance 
It is not easy to find any systematic effects of changes at the political side of local 
government on policy performance. At least in the short run, budget discipline and 
service production is not much affected by changes in political models. There are 
several explanations for this. Firstly, politicians have several goals which are not easy to 
reconcile. They want to promote the quality of services as much as they want to show 
budget discipline. Secondly, the commune is not an hierarchical organisation that is 
closely linked from the politicians on the top to the street-level bureaucrats who are 
responsible for service production. The organisational web is more loosely knitted, 
making effects of top level changes on service delivery difficult to predict.    
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NOTES 
 
 
                                                 
i. According to the legislation before 1993, the number of councillors had to vary between 13 
and 85, depending on the number of inhabitants in the municipality. In the new Local 
Government Act only a minimum number of councillors is given, ranging from 11 in the 
smallest communes (with less than 5 000 inhabitants) to 43 in the biggest ones (with more 
than 100 000 inhabitants). The new act permits a reduction in the number of council 
members. This was heavily opposed by the smaller parties, who argued that the 
representativity of the council was threatened. 
 
ii. Most Norwegian communes have four or five principal standing committees. Committees 
for health and social care, building and engineering, education and cultural affairs are found 
in most communes. In addition, some communes may have committees for industrial 
development and environmental affairs. 
 
iii. A special act was passed in 1986 to allow parliamentarism in Olso, while the experiment 
in Hedmark was part of the Free commune programme.  
4. The four communes were small and medium-sized rural communes, all participating in the 
free commune programme. 
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